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The literature on processing of person and number agreement contains some apparently
contradictory results. On the one hand, some ERP studies do not find a qualitative
difference between person and number when an agreeing verb does not match the
features of its subject, the controller of the agreement relation (Silva-Pereyra and
Carreiras, 2007; Zawiszewski et al., 2016). On the other hand, an ERP study reported
in Mancini et al. (2011b) did find a qualitative difference between agreement violations
in person and agreement violations in number, a result further corroborated by an fMRI
study reported in Mancini et al. (2017). At the same time, there is also a trend on which
the literature appears to agree: on the whole the response to agreement violations in
person is stronger than the response to number agreement violations. In this paper
we argue that the constellation of reported results can be accounted for by adopting
a theory of person and number features that has the following two core properties: (i)
pronouns are specified for both person and number, but regular NPs are specified for
number only and do not carry any person specification; (ii) all of first, second and third
person are characterized by one or more person features, whereas, in contrast, one of
the numbers (singular) corresponds to the absence of number features.
Keywords: person, number, agreement, processing, features
INTRODUCTION
The literature on processing of person and number agreement contains some apparently
contradictory results. On the one hand, some ERP studies do not find a qualitative difference
between person and number when an agreeing verb does not match the features of its subject,
the controller of the agreement relation (see Silva-Pereyra and Carreiras, 2007; Zawiszewski et al.,
2016). On the other hand, an ERP study reported in Mancini et al. (2011a) did find a qualitative
difference between agreement violations in person and agreement violations in number, a result
further corroborated by an fMRI study reported in Mancini et al. (2017). There is nonetheless also
a trend on which the literature appears to agree: on the whole the response to agreement violations
in person is stronger than the response to number agreement violations.
The qualitative differences involve both the neuroanatomical and the electrophysiological level.
Mancini et al. (2011a: 64) find that “while number agreement violations produced a left-anterior
negativity followed by a P600 with a posterior distribution, the negativity elicited by person
anomalies had a centro-posterior maximum and was followed by a P600 effect that was frontally
distributed in the early phase and posteriorly distributed in the late phase.” One conclusion from
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Mancini et al.’s (2017) fMRI study is that “while the posterior
portion of the (left middle temporal gyrus) is sensitive to both
Person and Number Violations, the anterior portion of this
region shows selective response for Person Violations” (p. 140).
In contrast, both Silva-Pereyra and Carreiras (2007) and
Zawiszewski et al. (2016) explicitly note that they found no
qualitative difference in the processing of person agreement
violations versus number agreement violations. Both studies do
find a quantitative effect. Zawiszewski et al. (2016) note that both
person violations and person+number violations elicited larger
P600 effects than number violations. Silva-Pereyra and Carreiras
(2007) note that the P600 effect induced by a person+number
violation is larger than either the effect of a person violation or
the effect of a number violation; they did not find a significant
difference between the latter two. The existence of a quantitative
difference between person and number violations is further
confirmed by the study by Mancini et al. (2017), who find a
greater response for person compared to number in the region
that is sensitive to both (the posterior portion of the left middle
temporal gyrus, see above).
We will argue that the apparently contradictory findings can
at least partly be understood in terms of the theory of phi-
features developed in Ackema and Neeleman (2013, 2018). Two
hypotheses play a crucial role in the account. First, pronouns
are specified for both person and number, but regular Noun
Phrases (which, following the theoretical literature, we will term
R-expressions) are specified for number only and do not carry any
person features. Second, all of first, second, and third person are
characterized by one or more person features. By contrast, one
of the numbers, namely singular, corresponds to the absence of
number features. Only plurals (and other numbers, such as dual,
trial, and paucal) carry one or more number features.
The first hypothesis bears on the contradictory findings
described above, because some of the experiments use
pronominal subjects as the controller of agreement, while
others use R-expressions. The second hypothesis provides a
handle on the quantitative difference between the effects of
person versus number violations.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we will provide an
outline of the theory of person and number features developed in
our earlier work (see section “A Theory of Person and Number
Features”). Then we will explain how this theory can inform a
model of error detection and repair of agreement violations (see
section “Detecting and Repairing Agreement Violations”). We
will assess how this model fits the reported data in the Section
“Accounting for Processing Differences Between Person and
Number Violations.” In the final section we mention a further
possible test that could be used to assess our model.
A THEORY OF PERSON AND NUMBER
FEATURES
The Feature Make-Up of Pronouns
In Ackema and Neeleman (2013, 2018), we propose that there
are two privative person features, dubbed PROX (for “proximate”)
and DIST (for “distal”). We interpret these features as functions,
following insights in Harbour (2011, 2016). Both operate on an
input set to deliver a subset as output.
The initial input set for the person system represents all
potential referents in a given context (Si+u+o in (1)). This set has
a fixed structure. It contains a subset Si+u, which itself contains
a subset Si. Si has the speaker (i) as an obligatory member; its
other members, if there are any, are associates of the speaker
and/or further individuals identified as speaker. Si+u has one
addressee (u) as an obligatory member, in addition to all members
of Si; its other members, if there are any, are associates of the
addressee and/or further individuals addressed by the speaker.
Si+u+o contains all members of Si+u; its remaining members,
if there are any, are neither associates of the speaker nor of
the addressee.
(1)
We assume that the input set Si+u+o is introduced by a
category N5 , which by definition forms the lexical core of a
pronominal expression.
The feature PROX introduces a function that operates on an
input set and discards its outermost “layer.” Applied to Si+u+o it
delivers Si+u. By contrast, DIST introduces a function that selects
the outermost layer of its input set. Applied to Si+u+o it delivers
Si+u+o − Si+u.
This idea can be implemented as follows. Suppose that the
various sets in (1) are ordered such that Si is the predecessor of
Si+u, while Si+u is the predecessor of Si+u+o (we will abbreviate
“predecessor” as Pred):
(2) a. Pred(Si+u) = Si
b. Pred(Si+u+o) = Si+u
If so, characterization of PROX and DIST is simple. The
definitions in (3) have the desired effect that PROX discards, while
DIST selects, those elements that are part of the outermost layer
of the input set:
(3) a. PROX(S) = Pred(S)
b. DIST(S) = S− Pred(S)
We now consider how first, second and third person readings
are derived, starting with the singular. The specification of the
third person singular is straightforward: it should be DIST, as this
feature will derive Si+u+o − Si+u, a set that excludes the speaker
and any addressees.
A second person singular reading can be generated by
applying both PROX and DIST. Notice that there is only one order
of application that yields an interpretation. If PROX is applied
first, Si+u is selected, a set containing the speaker (and any of their
associates) and individuals that the speaker addresses (and any
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of their associates). Applying DIST to this set removes Si, leaving
only addressees (and any associates) as potential members – the
required result [see (4)]. In the singular, this will yield a pronoun
that refers to exactly one addressee.
(4) [ [PRS PROX–DIST] N5 ]
= DIST(PROX(Si+u+o)) by definition
= DIST(Si+u) by (3a)
= Si+u − Si by (3b)
= Su
The opposite order of function application is not coherent.
DIST applied to Si+u+o yields Si+u+o − Si+u (a set that includes
neither the speaker, nor any addressees). But this set is not layered
[that is, Pred(S) is not defined for this set]. Therefore, PROX
cannot apply to it.
Consider finally the first person. Notice that in the singular just
applying PROX to Si+u+o will not do. This is because the output it
delivers, Si+u, is a set with two obligatory members: the speaker
and an addressee. Such a set obviously cannot be construed as
singular1. Therefore, at least in the singular, a first person reading
requires that PROX is applied to the output of PROX. As PROX
discards the outermost layer of its input set, this will deliver Si,
a set whose only obligatory member is the speaker and which
therefore permits a singular interpretation:
(5) [ [PRS PROX–PROX] N5 ]
= PROX(PROX(Si+u+o)) by definition
= PROX(Si+u) by (3a)
= Si by (3a)
Note that in this person system all persons have one or
more features2. This contrasts with the classical idea that third
person corresponds to the absence of person information (see
Benveniste, 1966). There are several previous theories in which
the third person is characterized by a feature specification,
among them Nevins (2007) and Harbour (2016). Evidence for
this hypothesis is intricate, and cannot be reviewed here. It is
based on a range of phenomena, including patterns of syncretism
in pronominal and verbal agreement paradigms (see Harbour,
2016; Ackema and Neeleman, 2018), dissimilation phenomena
in clitic clusters such as Spanish “spurious se” (Perlmutter, 1971;
Grimshaw, 1997; Nevins, 2007) and person clashes in situations
1We assume that number in the context of pronouns is a feature that reflects the
cardinality of its input set, rather than a feature (like person) that selects a subset
from this input set (see Ackema and Neeleman, 2018: chapter 3 for more details).
This means that there is no option to interpret a pronoun specified as [PROX] as
singular by having it refer to just the i or just the u that are contained in the output
of the person system (Si+u in this case).
2In a system with privative features such as this, we may expect pronouns
unmarked for person features. These arguably exist but correspond to impersonal
rather than personal pronouns (an example of an impersonal pronoun is the
English generic pronoun one as in one can see the Eiffel Tower from here); see
for instance Egerland (2003); D’Alessandro (2007), Nevins (2007); Ackema and
Neeleman (2018) for discussion.
where double agreement has a single morphological reflex
(Nevins, 2011; Ackema and Neeleman, 2018).
By contrast, in the number system, there is good evidence that,
while there are features for numbers such as plural, dual, and trial,
the singular corresponds to the absence of any number features.
Evidence for the unmarked status of the singular includes
Greenberg (1963: 94) observation that “there is no language
in which the plural does not have some non-zero allomorph
whereas there are languages in which the singular is expressed
only by zero.” Moreover, plural is both a target for morphological
impoverishment rules and a context that triggers such rules. This
behavior is typical of marked features (see Aalberse and Don,
2009, 2011; Nevins, 2011). Singular does not behave in the same
way: it is neither a target nor a context for impoverishment.
We thus arrive at the following inventory of
pronominal forms3:
(6) a. 1st person b. 2nd person c. 3rd person
Singular
(7) a. 1st person inclusive b. 1st person exclusive
Plural
c. 2nd person d. 3rd person
Plural
Notice that in the system just outlined, the first person does
not form a natural class with the third person to the exclusion
of the second person. This fits well with the results of a large-
scale study reported in Harbour (2016). Harbour looked at which
systematic patterns of syncretism are attested cross-linguistically,
where a systematic pattern of syncretism is one that is found in
3The difference between (7a) and (7b) corresponds to the distinction between first
person inclusives and exclusives, a distinction that is morphologically marked in a
number of languages. For our present purposes, this distinction is not relevant.
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all paradigms of a given language. He reports that no language
has a systematic syncretism for first and third person, whereas
there are languages that have a systematic syncretism for first
and second person, as well as languages that have a systematic
syncretism for second and third person. On the assumption that
the distribution of systematic syncretisms reflects the underlying
distribution of features, this shows that no feature is shared
uniquely by first and third person (“uniquely” meaning to the
exclusion of second person).
R-Expressions Do Not Have Person
Even though third person pronouns have a person specification
in the system outlined above, Ackema and Neeleman (2018)
argue that R-expressions cannot carry person features4. They
differ from pronouns in not being headed by N5 . This means
that they do not deliver Si+u+o to any person features that the
R-expression might contain, with the result that these features
would be uninterpretable. The evidence that R-expressions do not
carry any person information includes the following.
For a start, there are no first or second person R-expressions5.
A first-person R-expression, for instance, would refer to the
speaker and would obligatorily trigger first person agreement. It is
certainly possible to use an R-expression to refer to the speaker or
addressee (see for instance Collins and Postal, 2012 discussion of
what they term “imposters”). However, this is never accompanied
by obligatory first or second person agreement. Thus, the English
examples in (8) are possible in certain registers, with the subject
referring to the speaker. Nonetheless, these R-expressions cannot
license first person agreement, let alone that they require it:
(8) a. The present author thinks/∗think that this is not
justifiable.
b. Yours Truly has/∗have been awarded a Knighthood.
Further evidence that R-expressions like those in (8) are
not specified as first person comes from the observation that
in discourse they can easily be used ironically to refer to the
addressee, as well as the speaker:
(9) A: Yours Truly has been awarded a Knighthood. (Yours
Truly = speaker)
B: Well, then Yours Truly must be absolutely thrilled. (Yours
Truly = addressee)
Crucially, the equivalent is not possible with pronouns,
showing that these are specified for person. The following is
4The question of whether R-expressions and third person pronouns differ in their
specification for person is not often discussed in detail. In many proposals, the
two categories are treated on a par in that both or neither are specified for person.
There are a few exceptions that make the same cut that we take to be crucial; see in
particular Sichel, 2000.
5Simona Mancini points out that Basque NPs that carry the proximate plural article
–ok might be a counterexample to this generalization. We do not think so; Trask
(2003: 122) notes that in the relevant varieties a phrase like gizonok variously means
“we men,” “you men,” or “the men here.” This is consistent with an analysis of –
ok as a regular proximate marker, but not with an analysis as a person marker,
as the person appears to vary across these translations. (For some discussion of
expressions like we men, see Ackema and Neeleman, 2018: 155ff. and 294–295).
impossible, for instance (no matter how ironic B’s reply is
intended to be):
(10) A: I have been awarded a Knighthood. (I = speaker)
B: #Well, then I must be absolutely delighted.(I = addressee)
Similar observations can be made for R-expressions that refer
to the addressee.
Our proposal implies that R-expressions cannot carry a
third person feature either. At first sight, this seems unlikely,
given that R-expressions trigger what appears to be third
person agreement. However, this is not a particularly compelling
argument, because third person “agreement” also shows up in
the absence of any possible controller for it: it can function as
so-called default agreement. There are a number of languages
in which finite clauses without a subject are allowed. In such
clauses, the finite verb systematically shows up in its third
person form6. While we cannot go into this here, it follows
from the person system outlined above that a third person
feature specification is the only one that need not be interpreted,
and therefore the only one allowed on a verb in the absence
of a nominal controller. If R-expressions indeed do not have
person features, it follows that they should trigger default third
person agreement.
There is evidence that R-expressions differ from third person
pronouns. Their reference can contain speaker or addressee,
as already illustrated in (8) and (9), and as corroborated by
the examples in (11). In the latter examples, a first or second
person pronoun refers back to an R-expression (underlining
is used to indicate intended coreference). By contrast, a third
person pronoun cannot be antecedent for a first or second person
pronoun, as shown in (12). This follows if third person pronouns
are specified as DIST, while R-expressions are not.
(11) a. Anyone who knows the Dutch realizes they no longer
wear wooden shoes.
b. Anyone who knows the Dutch realizes we no longer wear
wooden shoes.
c. Anyone who knows the Dutch realizes you no longer wear
wooden shoes.
(12) a. Anyone who knows them realizes they no longer wear
wooden shoes.
b. ∗Anyone who knows them realizes we no longer wear
wooden shoes.
c. ∗Anyone who knows them realizes you no longer wear
wooden shoes.
We conclude that R-expressions do not have person features
that determine their reference. They never obligatorily trigger
6A related observation can be made for English. There are finite clauses that
have a subject, but not one that has phi-features. A case in point are clauses that
have a sentential subject. In this context, too, the finite verb carries third person
agreement (e.g., That Mary wants to move to Ireland surprises/∗surprise no one).
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first or second person agreement, and they can be co-referent
with any pronoun7.
DETECTING AND REPAIRING
AGREEMENT VIOLATIONS
Given the theory outlined in the previous section, let us consider
what might happen in processing when the input contains an
agreement error. First, of course, the error must be detected.
What this means is that the hearer/reader discovers that the
features on the agreeing verb are not as expected given the
feature specification of the subject. Second, a repair is carried
out. We suggest that repair takes the form of deletion of a feature
specification, insertion of a feature specification, or both. If both
are required, this is a more costly operation than just deletion
or insertion.
In principle, this repair can affect either the verb or the subject.
There is evidence, at least in the realm of number, that there
is variation in this regard. There is a preference to maintain
the information on the most recently encountered element, but
when repair of the preceding element is impossible it is the
most recent element whose feature specification is changed (see
Molinaro et al., 2008; Molinaro et al., 2011b). Repair of the subject
is impossible, e.g., when the subject is a coordination, which
cannot possibly be co-erced into a singular interpretation. For
our purposes below, it is the nature of the repair that is crucial,
not its location.
Let us first turn our attention to the detection of the agreement
error. Here, we expect a qualitative difference between person
and number in sentences in which the subject is an R-expression,
but not in sentences in which the subject is a pronoun. Consider
why. R-expressions are specified for number, but not for person.
This implies that if the verb carries incorrect agreement, the type
of error is qualitatively different for person and number. For
number, the error is a clash: both subject and verb are specified
for number, and the verb carries the wrong specification. For
person, there is no clash, since the subject does not have person.
Because of this, the verb should carry default agreement, which
is identical to third person (see section “A Theory of Person
and Number Features”). The error, therefore, is that the verb
carries a non-default person specification instead8. Schematically,
the difference between person errors and number errors with
7We should note that this conclusion does not imply that there are no contexts in
which R-expressions carry first or second person morphology. This is possible if the
morphology in question is agreement morphology, and therefore not interpreted
in the R-expression itself. In particular, when an R-expression has a predicative
function, it may agree with a first or second person subject. This can be observed,
e.g., in Classical Nahuatl (Launey, 2011) and Mohawk (Baker, 1996).
8In fact, in some pro drop languages plural R-expressions can be combined with
a first or second person verb if they refer to a group of people containing the
speaker or addressee (a phenomenon known as “unagreement,” see Hurtado,
1985). Pronouns never permit this possibility. There is a variety of analyses
available (e.g., Ackema and Neeleman, 2013; Höhn, 2016), but it should be clear
that the hypothesis that R-expressions do not have person provides a good basis
for an explanation. Unagreement is generally not possible in the singular, which is
why the experiments reported below use either pronouns or singular R-expressions
as subject. Unagreement gives rise to an ERP profile that is distinct from regular
agreement as well as from agreement errors, see Mancini et al. (2011b).
subjects that are R-expressions can be represented as follows,
where the Greek letters are simply shorthand for a particular
feature specification.
(13) NP [NMB: α]... V [NMB: β, PRS: γ]
Note that the specification for number is zero in the singular.
This counts as a feature specification, because zero in the context
of Num receives an interpretation (“n = 1”), distinct from the
interpretation of a plural specification. Hence, there is a clash if
subject and verb do not agree. However, given that R-expressions
lack person altogether, there can be no clash with the person
specification of the verb.
The situation is different when the subject is a pronoun,
as pronouns have person as well as number. For both
types of feature, then, the error will consist of a clash in
feature specification:
(14) Pronoun [NMB: α, PRS: β]... V [NMB: γ, PRS: δ]
We are therefore led to expect that in the early stages of
processing, when the detection of the agreement error takes
place, person and number will behave alike with pronominal
subjects, but will show a qualitative difference with subjects that
are R-expressions.
Consider next what will happen at the repair stage. For
number, there are two possible errors9. Either the subject is
singular and the verb plural, or the other way around. Above we
adopted the hypothesis that singular is a null feature specification.
Hence, the two errors can be schematically represented as follows
(both with pronouns and with R-expressions):
(15) a. NP/Pronoun [NMB: PL]... V [NMB: __)
b. NP/Pronoun [NMB: __]... V (NMB: PL)
In both cases, repair is a one-step process. It either consists
of insertion of the specification Pl (if the unspecified element is
repaired) or deletion of Pl (if the specified element is repaired).
For person, there are more possible errors, simply because
there are more person specifications. However, what all these
errors have in common is that repair cannot be a one-step
process. All persons carry person features (see section “A
Theory of Person and Number Features”), and therefore any
change in the person specification of the repaired element must
involve deletion of one person feature structure, followed by
insertion of a different one. For example, if the subject is a first
person pronoun, while the verb is third person, the situation
is as follows:
(16) Pronoun [PRS: PROX-PROX]... V [PRS: DIST]
If it is the verb that is repaired, [DIST] will be deleted and
[PROX-PROX] will be inserted. If it is the subject that is repaired,
it is the other way around.
9That is, possible errors in the context of the experiments discussed. There are
more logically possible errors if we include numbers other than singular and plural
(such as dual and trial). As far as we know, there is no experimental literature
testing examples with other numbers yet, and we will put them to one side.
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Thus, there is always a quantitative difference in the repair of
person errors and number errors. The former is more costly, as
it is a two-step process. Since repair obviously takes place after
detection, this quantitative difference should present itself later
in the process than the qualitative effects related to the detection
of agreement errors in the context of R-expressions.
So far, we considered person and number errors separately,
but of course the verb can carry a specification that is wrong for
both person and number. If so, the repair process will be more
costly still, as it must involve three steps: deletion or insertion of
a number feature specification, deletion of a person specification,
and insertion of a person specification. We may also expect
differences in error detection, simply because a double error
need not have the same effect as a single one, even disregarding
the different nature of the person error with pronominals and
R-expressions.
ACCOUNTING FOR PROCESSING
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PERSON AND
NUMBER VIOLATIONS
The discussion in the previous section gives rise to the following
expectations when the verb carries incorrect agreement:
(17) a. The subject is an R-expression: (i) In detection, person
behaves differently from number; (ii) In repair, person
errors are more costly than number errors.
b. The subject is a pronoun: (i) In detection, person behaves
the same as number; (ii) In repair, person errors are more
costly than number errors.
In order to evaluate whether these generalizations hold, we
must know what the neurolinguistic footprints might be of
detection of an agreement error and its repair.
There is a large amount of literature on the interpretation
of different waveforms in ERP studies. Although there does
not seem to be a clear consensus on this issue, there are
certainly trends. To begin with, a negative waveform between
250 and 500 ms after stimulus onset seems to be associated
with unexpected words in the input, including morphosyntactic
violations. This negative deflection comes into two or three types.
One is the N400. The N400 “is highly correlated (r = 0.9) with
an oﬄine measure of the eliciting word’s expectancy” (Kutas
and Federmeier, 2011: 624). This expectancy is often described
in semantic terms, but there are indications that this may be
too narrow, at least on the usual linguistic understanding of
“semantic.” For example, an N400 effect can be elicited by non-
linguistic actions, such as cutting bread with a saw (Proverbio
and Riva, 2009; Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). Furthermore,
it can be elicited by words that are unexpected in form, but
not in semantics. Thus, it is triggered by the form an for
the indefinite article in English if, in the current context,
the noun that is expected to follow starts with a consonant
(DeLong et al., 2005). Indeed, for what counts as unexpected,
simple word frequency appears relevant (Van Petten and Kutas,
1990). In short, although the N400 does not appear to index
semantic anomaly exclusively, or even linguistic anomaly, in
the context of language it seems correlated with detecting
unexpected words in the input, including certain morpho-
syntactic violations (Osterhout, 1997: 497; Tanner and Van Hell,
2014: 298).
There are other types of early negative deflection. In particular,
Left Anterior Negativity (LAN) and Anterior Negativity (AN)
are plausibly elicited specifically by morpho-syntactic errors,
including verb agreement errors as well as case marking errors
(Münte et al., 1993, 1997; Friederici et al., 1996; Gunter et al.,
1997; Coulson et al., 1998; Friederici and Frisch, 2000).
The size of the LAN effect appears to be partly determined
by the morpho-syntax of a language. In particular, it has been
observed that it increases the more important agreement is
for the parsing of grammatical dependencies (Friederici, 2011:
1381 and references cited there). Agreement is important for
detecting the subject of a clause if the agreement paradigm
is morphologically rich and therefore reliably indexes the
subject’s interpretation. Agreement is also important if the
position of the subject in the clause is not fixed, so that
word order does not provide a reliable clue as to what the
subject is. Conversely, agreement is less important for detecting
the subject if word order is strict, or if the morphological
verbal agreement paradigm is poor (i.e., contains a lot of
syncretisms). Nonetheless, there is some evidence that agreement
violations induce a LAN effect also in languages with poorer
agreement morphology and a relatively fixed word order, such
as Dutch and English (see Osterhout and Mobley, 1995; Hagoort
and Brown, 2000; see also Molinaro et al., 2011a for an
overview).
Overall, it seems reasonable to correlate the detection of an
unexpected agreement form of the verb in the input with a
negative waveform in the relevant timeframe. This being said,
we should acknowledge that there are some studies of agreement
errors that do not find an early negativity effect (see Nevins et al.,
2007). Our take on this is that there is a one-way implication:
early negativity is in indication of error detection, but error
detection is not guaranteed to produce early negativity10.
A further clear trend in the literature involves the P600,
a positive deflection starting around 500 ms after stimulus
onset and lasting a few 100 ms. The P600 is said to be
triggered by a range of linguistic anomalies or other difficulties,
including those associated with syntactic processing. It is, e.g.,
triggered by complicated syntax (Kaan et al., 2000; Friederici
et al., 2002), less preferred syntactic structure (Osterhout
et al., 1994; Itzhak et al., 2010), and by syntactic garden-path
effects, i.e., syntactic anomalies that result from misanalysis of
an ambiguity rather than from ungrammaticality (Osterhout
and Holcomb, 1992, 1993; Osterhout et al., 1994; Kaan and
Swaab, 2003). It has also been observed with a variety
of syntactic violations, see Gouvea et al. (2010: 150). In
view of this, one may expect a P600 effect to index the
repair of the morpho-syntactic structure that an agreement
violation necessitates.
10If so, studies that do not find early negativity can also not identify potential
differences in the detection of person and number agreement errors.
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With the above in mind, let us consider whether the reported
effects of agreement violations are in line with (17). One relevant
ERP study is reported by Silva-Pereyra and Carreiras (2007).
They tested Spanish sentences with pronominal subjects that
contained agreement violations of the following three types:
(18) a. Pronoun1PL... V1SG (number disagreement)
b. Pronoun2SG... V1SG (person disagreement)
c. Pronoun2PL... V1SG (person and number disagreement)
Given the predictions in (17b), we expect there to be no
qualitative differences between any of the examples where it
concerns error detection. We expect the errors in (18b) and (18c)
to give rise to a more costly repair than the one in (18a), as they
involve person. In addition, we expect (18c) to be more costly in
repair than (18b), as it involves a double violation.
Silva-Pereyra and Carreiras (2007) found that there were
indeed no qualitative differences between person and number
violations. They describe their findings as follows (where
ND = number disagreement, PD = person disagreement, and
NPD = disagreement for both person and number): “ND,
PD, and NPD all elicited an anterior negativity (AN) and
P600 pattern. An AN effect was only found in the NPD
with a different topography from the classic LAN effect as
it was lateralized to right and central sites. The P600 effect
elicited by the NPD condition was larger than the agreement
condition and that of ND and PD in the first window 500–
700, while the three disagreement conditions elicited larger P600
amplitudes than the agreement condition in the second window
700–900” (p. 201).
These findings meet our expectations relatively well.
The fact that no qualitative differences between person and
number were found where it concerns early negativity is
the result of pronominal subjects being used in the test
sentences. The repair involved in the double violation
condition is more costly than the repairs in either
single violation condition. The only unexpected finding
is the lack of a significant difference between number
disagreement and person disagreement in the amplitude of
the P600 effect.
Next, an ERP study by Zawiszewski et al. (2016) tested Basque
sentences with agreement violations schematized in (19). In this
study, too, the subject in all test sentences was a pronoun. The
pronoun was always second person singular, while the agreement
on the verb was varied to create number disagreement, person
disagreement, or disagreement for both person and number.
(19) a. Pronoun2SG... V2PL (number disagreement)
b. Pronoun2SG... V1SG (person disagreement)
c. Pronoun2SG... V1PL (person and number disagreement)
On the basis of (17b), we again expect no qualitative
differences in the effects triggered by the various violations. We
do expect a quantitative difference in the repair stage of the
process, where the violations that involve person should trigger a
larger effect than the number violation. We also expect the double
violation to give the largest effect in repair.
These expectations are largely met. Zawiszewski et al.
(2016) found that, first, all violation types triggered an N400-
P600 pattern. Second, person and person+number violations
elicited larger P600 effects than number violations. To be more
specific, with regards to the N400, “no differences were found
between person and number violations or between person
and person+number violations, while number violations
elicited a larger negativity over left-posterior sites than
person+number violations.” With regards to the P600, “no
differences were found between person and person+number
violations, while both person and person+number violations
elicited a larger P600 than number violations over posterior
sites accompanied by a larger negativity over frontocentral
sites” (p. 618). Zawiszewski et al. (2016):618) summarize their
findings as follows: “Our results revealed qualitatively similar
but quantitatively larger ERP signatures for person than for
number violations.”
This conclusion supports our main contention: if pronominal
subjects are used, no qualitative differences between person
and number violations are to be expected. Also, the hypothesis
that violations involving person should always give rise to
a more costly repair than violations only involving number,
and hence to larger P600 effects, is confirmed. We do
not have a specific account for the difference between the
number violation and the double violation with respect to the
amplitude of the N400, nor for the absence of a significant
difference in the size of the P600 in the double violation
condition and the person disagreement condition. (Note that
the latter finding is the opposite of what Silva-Pereyra and
Carreiras found).
A third relevant ERP study is the one by Mancini et al. (2011a).
They tested Spanish sentences with R-expressions as subject. The
test sentences were of the following types:
(20) a. NPSG... V3PL (number disagreement)
b. NPSG... V2SG (person disagreement)
Note that we have not labeled the NP subject as being third
person, in line with our hypothesis that R-expressions do not have
person. The structure in (20b) is therefore not actually a case of
disagreement; rather, the verb does not show the expected default
third person agreement that is selected when the controller does
not have person features. Crucially, this is a different type of
error than the one in (20a), where there is a clash between
the number specification of the subject (namely ø) and the
number specification of the verb; see section “A Theory of Person
and Number Features” for more detailed discussion. Hence,
as mentioned in (17a), we should find qualitative differences
between the sentences with a person violation and the sentences
with a number violation.
Mancini et al. indeed found that the parser is differentially
sensitive to the two features. “While number agreement
violations produced a left-anterior negativity followed by a
P600 with a posterior distribution, the negativity elicited by
person anomalies had a centro-posterior maximum and was
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followed by a P600 effect that was frontally distributed in
the early phase and posteriorly distributed in the late phase”
(Mancini et al., 2011a: 64).
In addition, “both anomalies produce a P600 effect that has
its maximum in posterior sites. Differences between number and
person emerged in terms of the amplitude of this effect, which
appears to be larger for the person mismatch” (Mancini et al.,
2011a: 73). The latter observation confirms the second prediction
in (17a), namely that repair of person violations is more costly
than repair of number violations regardless of the nature of
the subject.
A final relevant study, by Mancini et al. (2017), uses fMRI,
rather than ERP, as its investigative technique. This implies
that there is not enough temporal resolution to distinguish
the detection and repair stages of the processing of sentences
with agreement errors. However, fMRI can of course identify
qualitative and quantitative differences in the parsing process,
and so it does provide an opportunity to test the generalizations
in (17) provided their temporal dimension, and hence the distinct
reference to the detection and repair stages of the process, are
removed. If we do this, the generalizations are as follows:
(21) a. The subject is an R-expression: Person behaves
qualitatively differently from number and will have
a quantitatively larger effect.
b. The subject is a pronoun: There are no qualitative
differences between person and number, but person will
have a quantitatively larger effect.
Mancini et al. tested Spanish sentences with an R-expression
as subject, containing an agreement error of one of the following
two types:
(22) a. NPSG... V3PL (number disagreement)
b. NPSG... V2SG (person disagreement)
Since the subjects are R-expressions, we expect the behavior in
(21a). This is in line with what Mancini et al. found: “The direct
contrast between Person and Number Violations permitted the
uncovering of both quantitative and qualitative differences” (p.
147). More specifically, “A greater response for person compared
to number was found in the left middle temporal gyrus (LMTG).
However, critically, a posterior-to-anterior functional gradient
emerged within this region. While the posterior portion of the
LMTG was sensitive to both Person and Number Violations,
the anterior portion of this region showed selective response for
Person Violations” (p. 140).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no similar fMRI study
that compares person and number agreement violations, but uses
pronominal subjects instead. For now, then, the prediction in
(21b) is left untested.
In sum, the studies that use pronominal subjects to explore
agreement errors do not find qualitative differences between
person and number, while the studies that use R-expressions
as subject do find such differences. This is accounted for by
a theory in which pronouns have a person specification, but
R-expressions do not.
Studies differ in where they find significant quantitative
differences between number violations, person violations and
double violations. However, all significant differences that were
found follow a hierarchy number < person < number+person.
This is in line with the idea that repair of person violations is
more costly than repair of number violations, though perhaps the
difference in cost is relatively small.
A POSSIBLE FURTHER EXPERIMENT
Our proposal can be tested further, as one crucial data
set currently remains unexplored. This involves third person
pronouns. In traditional grammar, such pronouns are treated on
a par with what we call R-expressions: both are third person.
However, on the theory proposed here only the pronouns carry
a third person specification; the R-expressions are personless.
Hence, the prediction is that there should no contrastive behavior
between third person pronouns and first and second person
pronouns. The contrast should be between all pronouns on the
one hand and R-expressions on the other hand. For example,
an agreement violation between a third person singular pronoun
and, say, a first person singular verb is of the type in (23a),
and therefore involves a clash in person features. An agreement
violation between a singular R-expression and a first person
singular verb is, as discussed, of the type in (23b), which does not
involve such a clash.
(23) a. Pronoun [NMB: __, PRS: DIST]... V [NMB: __, PRS: PROX-
PROX]
b. NP [NMB: __]... V [NMB: __, PRS: PROX-PROX]
Relevant examples with third person pronominal subjects
have not been tested, as far as we know. We expect that there
are qualitative differences in error detection between the two
conditions in (23).
CONCLUSION
We hope to have shown that theoretical accounts of agreement
can be used to interpret experimental data, and that experimental
data can be used to test theoretical accounts. In particular, we
have argued that contrasts between the processing of person
and number agreement violations may fall out from a specific
theory of person and number features according to which (i)
R-expressions do not have person, while pronouns do, and
(ii) singular is the absence of a number feature, while all
persons, including third person, have person features. To the
extent that other theoretical accounts of person and number
make different predictions, the experimental data can be said to
confirm this theory.
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